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Abstract
This article examines the alcohol industry’s legal challenges to minimum unit
pricing (MUP) in Scotland through the stages heuristic of the policy process. It
builds on previous studies of alcohol pricing policy in Scotland and across the
UK, and of the use of legal challenges by health harming industries to oppose
health policy globally. Having failed to prevent MUP passing into law, industry
actors sought to frustrate the implementation of the legislation via challenges
in the Scottish, European and UK courts. However, the relevance of legal
challenges is not limited to the post-legislative stage of the policy process but
was foreshadowed in all earlier stages of the policy process. The potential for a
legal challenge to MUP, and the alcohol industry’s clearly articulated intention
to pursue such action, was used by industry actors to seek to prevent the
adoption of MUP in the agenda setting, policy formulation and legislative
stages and created significant ‘regulatory chill’ in other areas of Scottish and UK
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alcohol policy. Litigation, and the prospect of it, was thus part of a coherent and
integrated long-term strategy which adapted to changes in the political climate
and to different stages in the policy process.While both the rhetoric and reality
of litigation failed to prevent policy implementation, it succeeded in causing
a delay of six years, imposing significant costs on the Scottish government
and creating policy inertia in Scottish alcohol policy subsequently. Moreover,
the inclusion of a ‘sunset clause’ in the legislation, requiring ongoing evaluation
of the policy’s effects, presents additional opportunities for the industry to
reverse MUP. Thus, industry strategies to undermine MUP and delay further
alcohol policy developments require ongoing attention by policy actors and
scholars.
Keywords: alcohol policy; Minimum Unit Pricing; Scotland; legal challenge;
alcohol industry
Introduction
This article examines the role of litigation in alcohol industry strategy to oppose
the introduction of minimum unit pricing (MUP) for alcohol in Scotland. It
builds on previous analyses of MUP debates and corporate political strategies
both in Scotland (Holden and Hawkins, 2012, McCambridge et al., 2013,
Katikireddi et al, 2014a, 2014b, Katikireddi and Hilton, 2015, Katikireddi and
McLean, 2012) and across the United Kingdom (UK) (Holden et al., 2012,
Hawkins and Holden, 2013, 2014). As such, it is of relevance to scholars of
alcohol policy, health policy, and public policy in Scotland and beyond. In
addition, the article contributes also to the limited, yet expanding, literature on
the role of legal challenges by corporate political actors globally to stymie the
introduction of policies, which affect the business models and profits of health
harming industries (McGrady, 2007, 2011, 2012 Voon andMitchell, 2012a, Voon
et al., 2014, Jarman, 2015, Hawkins and Holden, 2016, Hawkins et al., 2018,
Holden and Hawkins, 2018a, 2018b).
The case of MUP is an example of a legal challenge brought under
European Union (EU) single market law to policies introduced by a devolved
administration within a member-states, in ways that reflect the specific
competencies devolved to Scotland (i.e. health) and retained by the UK
government (i.e. taxation) (see Holden and Hawkins, 2012, 2016).
Consequently, the analysis below will be of relevance to those working on
the topics of multi-level governance (MLG) and corporate political strategy in
Scotland, the United Kingdom (UK), the EU and beyond (Hawkins et al.,
2018, 2019).
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Much of the literature on industry legal challenges focuses on the use of
international trade and investment agreements to challenge domestic laws
by the tobacco industry (McGrady, 2007, 2011, 2012, Voon and Mitchell,
2012b, Jarman, 2015, Hawkins and Holden, 2016, Hawkins et al., 2018,
Holden and Hawkins, 2018b). While the tobacco industry has been the most
litigious industry, reflecting its marginalisation from other forms of policy
influence in many contexts, such agreements afford similar opportunities to
industries in other sectors (Eberhardt and Olivet, 2012). This includes the
alcohol industry’s use of trade and investment agreements (Voon et al., 2014),
and EU single market law to challenge MUP (Holden and Hawkins, 2016,
2018b).
The existing literature focuses almost exclusively on ‘live challenges;’ that is
to say legal proceedings instigated against policies already adopted in an
attempt to prevent or overturn their introduction. While these studies
recognise the potential ‘chilling effect’ of litigation (Fooks and Gilmore, 2013,
Côté, 2014, Hawkins and Holden, 2016) – whereby governments in other
settings are deterred from adopting similar measures – such impacts (i.e. the
absence of policy action) may be challenging to study. Moreover, little attention
has been paid to ‘internal chilling effects’ or the effects of legal challenges
on the wider policy developments within the policy context in which they
are undertaken. The present study thus offers a valuable addition to our
understanding of the relationship between legal challenges and policy making
in the area of health, and public policy more generally, by documenting the role
of legal challenges in shaping the policy process.
The argument developed below is that the potential for legal challenge
under EU single market law was a vital component of the alcohol industry’s
political strategy throughout the Scottish MUP debates which had a key
structuring effect on all stages of the policy process. The eventual initiation of
legal proceedings by the Scotch Whisky Association (SWA) in the Court of
Session in 2012 represented the adaptation and escalation of the alcohol
industry’s political strategy to prevent MUP coming into force after its adoption
into law. However, the relevance of this litigation is not limited to the
implementation stage of the policy process. It was a key industry influencing
tool throughout the MUP debate.
To demonstrate this, the present study employs the ‘stages heuristic’ of the
policy process as an analytic framework. This identifies sequential stages in
policy development from the initial framing of social issues as ‘policy problems’
and their entry onto the policy agenda; through the development of potential
solutions to these; to the enactment (or rejection), implementation and
evaluation of interventions (Lasswell, 1956, Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973,
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Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1980). The analytical value of the stages heuristic for
the present case lies in the way in which it highlights the importance of the
post-legislative implementation and evaluation phases in the policy process.
Even after the formal adoption of a policy – including the passage of new
laws – policy actors such as the alcohol industry expend considerable efforts to
block the implementation of such measures and to shape the ways in which
they are evaluated and maintained. Such activities were evident in the case of
MUP for alcohol in Scotland with significant consequences for Scottish policy
making and for population health, which are yet to be fully examined in the
scholarly literature.
Previous studies have found that the alcohol industry is capable of engaging
in every stage of the policy process, through highly-sophisticated, multi-
dimensional political strategies (McCambridge et al., 2014, 2018). This is in
keeping with wider studies of the political strategies of the alcohol, tobacco and
other health harming industries (McCambridge et al., 2018, Brandt, 2012,
Kenworthy et al., 2016). Corporations in different sectors tailor their political
strategies to the specificities of the policy spaces in which they are active and
adapt these incrementally in response to changing circumstances, including
developments at different stages of the policy process (Baron, 1995, Hillman
et al., 2004, Shaffer and Hillman, 2000).
In this article, we identify how alcohol industry strategy evolved in response
to developments in the alcohol policy process in Scotland and the implications
of this for the subsequent development of alcohol policy in Scotland and
elsewhere in the UK. The 2011 Scottish Elections, at which a majority Scottish
National Party (SNP) government was elected on a manifesto commitment to
introduce MUP, was a key juncture in both the development of alcohol pricing
policy and in the evolution of industry strategy to oppose this. Prior to this, the
industry had relied on political access and lobbying to stymie the development
of MUP, but had continually adapted their approach to the changing political
context in Scotland (Holden and Hawkins, 2012). The lack of well-developed
industry connections with the 2007–2011 Scottish National Party (SNP)
minority administration, and the political commitment that the government
demonstrated to MUP, had led industry actors to shift their lobbying targets
from ministers and officials in the agenda setting and policy development
phases to opposition Members to the Scottish Parliament (MSPs) in the
legitimation/legislative stage. This allowed them to successfully lobby for the
removal of the MUP proposals from the 2010 Alcohol Etc. (Scotland) Act
(Holden and Hawkins, 2012). After 2011 the parliamentary arithmetic meant it
was no longer possible to stop MUP becoming law and the industry strategy
evolved again.
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Following the passage of the 2012 Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) (Scotland) Act,
the industry shifted to towards more overtly confrontational strategies,
most obviously the legal challenge they mounted in the Scottish, European
and UK courts. This was designed to prevent, or at least delay, the imple-
mentation of MUP and to absorb governmental resources, thereby under-
mining its capacity for further policy action and shaping the entire Scottish
alcohol and health policy space. However, while legal challenges were clearly
intended to stymie the post-legislative introduction of MUP, we suggest that
its significance to MUP, and Scottish alcohol policy more generally, is not limited
to this implementation phase. Rather, the potential for judicial review of
MUP cast a shadow over the entire policy process. The commencement of legal
actions in the Court of Session can be seen, therefore, as the final phase in
a co-ordinated, sequential and multi-faceted political strategy, which planned
for, and adapted to, different eventualities and outcomes at each stage of the
policy process.
The ‘stages heuristic’ of the policy process
The stages heuristic of the policy represents a simplified, ‘ideal type’ model of
the policy process, which underplays the complexity and ‘messiness’ of
policy-making and the overlapping, non-linear movement between the stages
of this process which are captured by more nuanced, multifarious theorisations
of the policy process. Consequently, its application in the field of policy
studies has been subject of some critique from those working within other
frameworks (see Nakamura, 1987, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). These
limitations notwithstanding, the stages heuristic remains a useful device for
conceptualising the evolution of policy debates and the evolution of policy
actors’ political strategies at different points in the process. In this article, it
provided the framework through which we conceptualised the impact of legal
challenges at different stages of the MUP policy process policy and informed
the analysis of the conceptualisation of the current article and the analysis of
the interview data from which this article emerges.
Whilst the precise terminology employed to describe each stage in
the policy process has evolved over time and varies between studies,
proponents of the stages heuristic identify and examine seven principal
stages of the policy-making process: agenda setting, policy formulation,
legitimation (i.e. legislation and/or enactment), implementation, evaluation
and policy maintenance. Agenda setting refers to the process through
which social objects become identified as policy problems requiring a
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governmental response. The policy formulation phase involves identifying
concrete responses to policy problems and gaining the political commitment to
enact them.
The legitimation phase refers to the various means through which policies are
enacted and through which consent is sought for their adoption. In democratic
settings, this occurs most commonly through the passage of legislation in which
popular consent is transmitted via elected representatives in parliament and
assemblies. In the case of MUP, the legitimation phase focussed on the highly
contested attempts to pass legislation on MUP through the Scottish Parliament
between 2010 and 2012. For this reason, and to ensure analytical clarity, we
refer to this stage as the legitimation/legislative phase in the present article.
However, the wider process of legitimation can be seen to encompass the
justifications and support for policies that feed into parliamentary deliberations
and decision-making, including the identification and appraisal of supporting
evidence for the scale of a policy problem and the effectiveness of the proposed
intervention in the period from the 2008 MUP consultation onwards. This tends
to be the phase of the policy process, which receives most attention from both
scholars and the wider public. It offers concrete events, actions and processes
(i.e. policy documents and Bills, speeches and votes in parliament) which
receive media attention and offer themselves as objects of study. This, however,
risks underplaying the crucial role of agenda setting and policy formulation in
defining the terms and parameters of policy debates, which create path
dependencies towards certain policy options while excluding others. For these
reasons, policy framing has been identified as a vital component of the Scottish
alcohol policy making process (Katikireddi et al, 2014a, Hawkins and Holden,
2013) as policy actors seek to influence the policy debates at the earliest
possible juncture (Hawkins and Holden, 2014, Lukes, 1974).
The implementation stage of the policy process has received less attention
from policy scholars and has a lower prominence in the public consciousness
than the legitimation/legislative stage. This is perhaps due to the perception
that, once a policy is enacted, the debate is over or the issue has been resolved.
There is a widespread misconception that ‘implementation should be easy’
(Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973). In fact, many of the most arduous aspects
of policy debates can relate to the specific details and mechanics of how a
policy will be implemented. Well-resourced policy actors are able to employ
various strategies to seek to prevent or delay the introduction of even
democratically approved policy measures, particularly those characterised by
technical complexities. There is little evidence on alcohol industry strategies in
this stage (McCambridge et al., 2018). In the case of MUP, the implementation
phase was dominated by an industry-led legal challenge to the policy in the
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Scottish, European and UK courts. Policy evaluation is also of vital importance
to the success of a policy, and the Scottish Government has put in place
mechanisms to evaluate the effectiveness of the policy and a ‘sunset clause’
(see below) which will be vital to the long-term maintenance of the policy.
It is the implementation and evaluation stages of the policy process,
which form the basis of the analysis of the Scottish MUP debates below.
Whilst implementation was significantly delayed, and evaluation remains
ongoing, we document how industry actors sought, and continue to seek,
to shape these phases of the policy process. The article emerges from a
wider study of UK alcohol policy since 2010, focussing on MUP (in both
England and Scotland) and wider policy developments across the UK in this
period, including the public health responsibility deal (for England) and the
2016 revision of the Chief Medical Officers’ drinking guidelines. The analysis
below draws on 26 semi-structured interviews (see Brinkmann, 2013,
Rubin and Rubin, 2012) conducted between February and October 2018 with
policy actors (parliamentarians, civil servants, civil society actors and
academics) in Edinburgh and London, which focussed on the range of topics
and events examined in the study. Interviews sought to understand the timing
and dynamics of policy debates, and the roles played by policy actors inside and
outside of government (including but not limited to the alcohol industry) in
determining the outcomes of alcohol policy making in this timeframe.
Respondents were identified and recruited using purposive and snowball
sampling following a stakeholder analysis (Varvasovszky and Brugha, 2000,
Brugha and Varvasovszky, 2000). Interviews were audio-recorded, transcribed
and analysed using thematic coding (see Braun and Clarke, 2006).
The agenda setting, policy formulation and legislative stages:
the rhetorical uses of the legal challenge
The period before 2011 covered the agenda setting and policy formulation
stages of the Scottish MUP debate and the beginning of the legitimation/
legislative stage, which culminated in the 2007–2011 SNP minority govern-
ment’s unsuccessful attempt to pass MUP into law via the 2010 Alcohol Etc.
(Scotland) Act. The legitimation/legislation stage ended, and the implemen-
tation stage began, in 2012 with the passage of MUP into law in the Alcohol
(Minimum Pricing) (Scotland) Act 2012 under the SNP majority government.
Whilst the legal challenge of the Scotch Whisky Association (SWA) to MUP was
initiated only after the passage of MUP into law, the prospect of a potential
court case cast a shadow over the entire policy process, supporting different
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aspects of industry strategy in different phases. It is important, therefore, to see
the legal challenge both in instrumental terms and as having important
rhetorical and symbolic dimensions. The rhetorical threat of legal challenge was
designed to prevent the MUP legislation passing in the first instance but, should
this strategy fail, the industry would be seeking to overturn, or at least delay,
the implementation of the policy via actual litigation. The prospect of defending
a legal challenge – and the implications this would have for the Scottish
Government – was raised by industry actors during the policy formation and
legitimation/legislative phases in an attempt to shape the policy debate
and undermine the Scottish Government’s commitment to introducing
the policy. This created additional complications in the legislative process –
for example, the need to seek additional legal opinions and guarantees before
proceeding – which slowed its conclusion (see Hawkins and Holden, 2016). As
one NGO respondent commented:
[The SWA] made it very clear from the start, that there would be a legal
challenge, and it would be a difficult legal process. […] I think as soon as
the issue was aired, that that was a key plank of their argument. And […]
they kind of presented a position that they understood the international
legal dimension, particularly the European legal dimension, in a way
that the Scottish Government didn’t. So, they presented that they were
involved in trade discussions around the world all the time, and they
were very experienced at it, and were doing it all the time […]. That was
pretty much their angle right from the start, and it was the Scotch
Whisky Association that we were hearing most from on that. […] But I
think it was presented in a tone of, ‘you know, we’ve been involved in
these very complicated negotiations that you know nothing about, take
it from us.’
This account was supported by civil servants involved in the policy process who
recalled industry actors raising the potential of legal challenges on the very day
on which former Justice Secretary, Kenny MacAskill, set out the Government’s
intention to introduce MUP in March 2009.
As noted by previous studies, prior to 2010 opposition parties were the key
conduit for the industry’s efforts to prevent MUP (Holden and Hawkins, 2012).
This included statements that the Scottish Government would face a legal
challenge and provided grounds for them to oppose MUP. As one civil servant
familiar with the MUP process commented:
[The industry] were getting at the opposition by saying, ‘well, this
legislation is open to challenge.’ And the opposition parties, who had
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already sort of made up their mind to oppose it, were actually jumping
on that as well. They were saying it’s open to challenge so how can we
support it. […] The threat of legal action was constant and consistent
throughout the entire process really from day one.
The significant resources at the industry’s disposal allowed them to
commission legal opinions, which became important points of reference
within the policy debate, and a pretext for contacting and engaging key policy
actors, including the core policy team working on MUP and other actors across
government, who may be affected by the legal implications of the policy. As the
previously quoted civil servant continued:
[They were] commissioning opinions from various counsel, which was
sort of backing up their position […] and writing in to ministers in sort of
fairly general terms to say, we have counsel’s opinion which says this is
contrary to competition law because of X, Y and Z. And that was pretty
constant throughout. When they weren’t getting any traction […], they
were then trying other bits of Government at fairly senior levels. So, for
example the director responsible for enterprise and industry was
getting letters from SWA saying, what these guys in Health and Justice
are doing is contrary to European law. And there was various bits of
Government, very senior officials, that were being picked off to try and
get them to put pressure on us to say: ‘are you sure you know what
you’re doing?’ […] some fairly senior people saying: ‘you do know the
sort of implications of what you guys are doing?’
From legislation to implementation: litigating MUP
Following the election of the SNP majority government committed to
introduction of MUP in 2011 there was also a realisation amongst industry
actors and other stakeholders that the passage of the measures into law had
become inevitable. As one NGO actor explained:
The political arithmetic changed thereafter […] the political debate
was over, so the SNP, the Greens, the Liberal Democrats, and the
Conservatives were all, you know, supportive of the policy, and wanted
to see it come in.
This was echoed by a representative from the Scottish Government:
My reading of it is that there was an understanding by the opponents of
MUP that because there was a majority government now – and
because, you know, they’ve been elected with a very clear manifesto
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commitment to do MUP – that […] it was going to happen one way or
another, so the shift in focus then is from […] lobbying around
parliament with the 2010 legislation to then trying to find ways to
prevent the implementation of the legislation after 2011 and principally
through the legal challenge.
The Alcohol (Minimum Unit Pricing) (Scotland) Act received Royal Assent
in June 2012. In July that year, the SWA launched a challenge to the legislation
in the Court of Session in Edinburgh, on the basis that it infringed both UK
(including the 1707 Act of Union) and European Union (EU) single market law
(see Hawkins and Holden 2016). The Outer House of the Court of Session found
in favour of the Scottish Government, but the SWA appealed that decision. The
Inner House of the Course of Session (the Court of Appeal) referred the case to
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) for a preliminary ruling on
the relevant aspects of EU law in April 2014. The Opinion of the Advocate
General preceded a formal judgement by the CJEU in December 2015, before
the matter was passed back to the Scottish courts to rule on the case. The Inner
House found in favour of the Scottish Government in July 2016, but the
decision was again appealed by the SWA. The UK Supreme Court finally decided
the case in favour of the Scottish Government in November 2017, exhausting all
legal avenues open to the SWA. MUP was implemented in May 2018: six years
after its passage into law, and seven years after the SNP majority government
was elected on a manifesto commitment to introduce the policy. However, the
rationale for pursuing legal challenges so exhaustively was not limited to the
desire to block the implementation of the policy but served a wider purpose
within industry actors’ overall political strategies.
Shaping perceptions of the legal case
At various stages of the legal process, particularly while the case was before the
European court, industry actors sought to shape perceptions of the MUP case
and its likely outcome as different judgements were delivered. As one NGO
respondent commented: ‘They would constantly put out PR saying that they
had won and that the case had been defeated, when in fact it hadn’t been.’
There was an attritional character to the strategy, apparent in another
NGO actor’s account, which suggested their objective was ‘to get the
government to give up, to get the government to accept defeat’ in their
defence of the case.
NGOs responded by offering their own unequivocal interpretations of the
judgements, arguing the courts supported the Scottish Government’s positions,
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despite some internal doubts about the potential outcome of the case. As one
NGO respondent commented:
I guess my attitude on this was just not to ever admit any doubt about it.
[…] And I just kept on constantly, constantly, constantly saying that and
trying to get other people into that space as well. And I think that was
the right thing to do.
Engaging public opinion, and shaping perceptions about the feasibility of MUP,
were thus a key component of the policy process as policy actors on both sides
sought to undermine or buttress the political commitment of the government
in light of this.
Draining resources
The lengthy series of legal challenges represented a significant drain on the
Scottish Government’s resources. Asked about this, a civil servant familiar with
the government’s defence of the action commented:
Very, very significantly, both directly and indirectly […]. [There was] a
division at the time with 70 odd people, one of the biggest divisions
in the government, and which dealt with things like vaccination policy,
[… plain packaging of cigarettes] and other aspects of booze and obesity
and all of that stuff and running multiple bits of legislation and
sometimes multiple court cases. But this was the most important,
this was the thing that [the division] needed to invest time in most
and there were several people both within [that division] and in wider
teams in the legal directorate and in the statistic analytical services
team who were, for very long periods of time, doing little else apart
from this.
[…] I think it may even have been above 10,000 pages of material and
reports are in front of it. […] Somebody needed to have read all of that
and to keep up with it and to be thinking about the best way, the best
approach to take in court and to be reading the other side’s material
and thinking also about […] where it was going to go to next because it
was perfectly plain, particularly in the earlier court hearings, it was
perfectly plain that whoever won the first round that was not the end of
it […] where is it going to next and is there anything that we should be
doing now to prepare for that.
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Much of the court case turned on the effectiveness of MUP in achieving the
stated goals of the Scottish Government and the inability of other possible
measures to achieve the same outcomes through less trade restrictive measures
(see Hawkins and Holden, 2016, Holden and Hawkins, 2018a). The SWA
submitted significant volumes of information and evidence to the court,
including critiques of the Scottish Government’s evidence in support of MUP.
This placed significant time pressures on both the Scottish Government, and the
researchers providing this evidence, to respond to such industry submissions.
Block, amend, delay
Respondents in this study were unanimous in their belief that the primary
purpose of the legal challenges was to prevent the introduction of MUP. Failing
this, however, their secondary objective was to delay its introduction as long as
possible. Whilst they failed to prevent the introduction of MUP, they were able
to delay its implementation significantly.
The duration of the legal case and the extent to which the SWAwas prepared
to exhaust all possible avenues available to them surprised some government
actors. As one civil servant commented:
[…] it was appeal after appeal, and challenge after challenge, right
up to the Supreme Court. I never really thought they would go that far.
[…] It just surprised me how much resource they put into trying to
scupper this.
This was reflected by NGO respondents, who felt the decision to pursue the
legal challenge to the bitter end was a strategic mistake on the part of the SWA.
In so doing, they misjudged both the determination of the government to act
on price and the mood of the population who were convinced of the need for
decisive action on alcohol and were prepared to accept price-based measures.
According to a former Minister:
We always had fall-back positions. Plus, we had big public support
saying, ‘well, that’s wrong.’ […] They weren’t wired into communities,
and they weren’t picking that up. And I think that just comes back to a
general arrogance. You know, we’re the Scotch Whisky Association, you
know, we do what’s good for you, you should know that. You know, you
[the government] do what we tell you.
The doggedness of their actions was seen some respondents as reflecting a
determination to avoid the regulatory fate which had befallen the tobacco
industry in previous decades.Whilst the SWA failed to prevent the introduction
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of MUP, they did succeed in delaying its introduction significantly in Scotland.
This, in turn, prevented or slowed its adoption in England,Wales and elsewhere
(Hawkins and McCambridge, 2019). As a former civil servant commented, this
delay represented a significant achievement for the industry:
[…] if we see their objective as not bringing it in at all they failed. But,
actually, in the meantime they delayed it. They’ve tied it all up in knots.
They’ve created a lot of doubt about it.
Delays of this kind are useful to industry actors and mirror the ‘block, amend,
delay’ tactics used by the tobacco industry in opposing the 2014 EU tobacco
products directive (Peeters et al., 2015). The ability to delay legislation allows
other events to intervene. There may be a change of government and political
direction, a shift in public opinion, or a crisis to which government time and
resources may be diverted. Even measures that seem inevitable may never
come to pass. In the interim, businesses can continue to exploit the current
arrangements and can begin to adapt their business models and market
strategies in response to proposed policies. Moreover, they can seek to
undermine or weaken measures in ways amenable to their commercial
interests. Finally, delay may render aspects of the policy out of date and thus
less impactful. For example, respondents identified that the proposed 50p rate
of MUP proposed in 2012 would in fact be a lower price in real terms by 2018
because of inflation over the intervening six years.
Policy inertia
Whilst welcoming the introduction of MUP and recognising the scale of the task
faced by the Scottish Government to bring this into effect, some respondents
felt that this battle had been won at the expense of other areas of alcohol
policy, in which progress has subsequently stalled. There was a concern
amongst alcohol advocates that, following the passage of such a high-profile
policy as MUP, the Scottish Government’s position was that alcohol had been
dealt with and no further action was needed. There was also a sense,
respondents felt, that alcohol had had its fair share of time and resources and
that it was now the turn of related issues such as obesity. This was related to
perceptions of resource exhaustion (see above) and reluctance to take on other
controversial issues, which may also face significant industry opposition. As one
NGO respondent commented:
The implementation of minimum pricing, and seeing it through to the
court case, and the secondary legislation that’s been required, all of that
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has been led by the Health team […] [T]hat has completely occupied
that team. So, you know, we should have had [a refreshed alcohol
strategy] more than two years ago. And it still hasn’t issued. So, I think,
you know, it has just completely soaked up the effort of that team, over
that time, and before.
Some respondents believed that alcohol policy developments have been
undermined by cuts in the numbers of civil servants and the different policy
priorities of incoming ministers who were less interested in alcohol. Yet the
MUP experience clearly also played a part in this. The same respondent
continued:
I think, you know, overriding all of that is a kind of sense of regulatory
chill of, ‘well, we’ve been tied up in this legal mess around MUP for a
number of years, […] what can we do that isn’t gonna (sic) get us
in court again?’ […] So, we’re in a bizarre situation in relation
to marketing, where there’s a much stronger evidence base around
alcohol marketing, and the harms to children, than there is around
junk food marketing, and harm to children. And yet, as things
currently stand, there is a potential will to legislate on that, but not
on alcohol.
This was supported by another NGO actor:
I mean, the problem we’ve got here though now is, I think that
the government’s gone cool on doing anything else that’s going to
tie them up in court […] In alcohol specifically. I think they’ve moved
on to other issues. Obesity is far more of a priority and drugs is a
priority, because we’ve got highest rates of drug deaths that we’ve
ever had.
Given the wider effects that the MUP debates have had on Scottish alcohol
policy and the political will to take on other issues, the industry’s efforts to
influence alcohol policy were not completely unsuccessful. The significant
resources expended in opposing MUP failed to prevent its introduction but
succeeded in delaying wider progress in alcohol policy, including the
development of a new Scottish alcohol strategy (eventually published in
November 2018), and slowed the diffusion of MUP to other parts of the UK
(Hawkins and McCambridge, 2019). Perhaps most importantly, it sent a signal
to the Scottish Government and policy makers elsewhere that the industry
would fight policies regarded as detrimental to their interests to the bitter end,
with significant political and material costs for any government.
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Evaluation
Evaluation is a vital stage in the policy process. Understanding the
effectiveness of adopted measures is essential to support good governance
and evidence informed policy. This, in turn, impacts on the maintenance
of the policy and its acceptance amongst key stakeholders and the wider public.
From an industry perspective, the evaluation stage offers opportunities
to question and potentially undermine the effectiveness of this policy,
to influence public support and to press for its repeal. The evaluation of
MUP in Scotland was delegated to the Monitoring and Evaluating
Scotland’s Alcohol Strategy (MESAS) group within NHS Scotland (NHS
Scotland, 2019).
In the case of MUP, the importance of the evaluation process was heightened
by the insertion of a ‘sunset clause’ in the Alcohol (Minimum Unit Pricing)
(Scotland) Act. This required the policy to be renewed in law after a specific
implementation period, via a vote in the Scottish Parliament. In part, this was
included in an attempt to dispel criticisms of, and reduce controversy
surrounding, such a novel policy intervention. Respondents disagreed about
whether this was useful in securing the passage of the legislation under the
SNP majority government. However, the inclusion of the clause in the
legislation proved important during the subsequent legal challenge. As a
former Scottish Government actor commented:
It proved probably unnecessary in the Scottish Parliamentary pro-
cedures, but it became I think invaluable, […] later on in the process
where what we were … in essence what we were saying was we think
this will work.
This view was supported by an NGO representative, who saw the clause as vital
in the context of the legal challenge:
I think it was pretty clear from the Supreme Court judgement, and also
from the Court of Session hearings in Scotland, that the recognition that
this measure was experimental, was one that I think the courts thought
that was a good thing to have been acknowledged […] that the sunset
clause and evaluation was an important part of them finding the
measure to be, you know, having been appropriately considered by
Parliament.
Industry actors sought involvement in the MESAS evaluation process,
a request to which the Scottish Government acceded with the inclusion of
industry representatives on one of the Economic Impact and Price Evidence
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Advisory Groups; one of five advisory bodies overseeing the evaluation (NHS
Scotland, 2019). As one NGO respondent suggested:
So, that was a trade-off, when the Supreme Court Judgement was
handed down, I believe. The Scotch Whisky Association met with Nicola
Surgeon, I believe, and demanded that they were involved in the
evaluation, that they’d stop their public opposition to the policy. And,
they do, they sit on the Advisory Group to the evaluations.
Notwithstanding conflicts of interest and preceding events, industry partici-
pation in the evaluation process would permit ongoing access to policy-makers,
and potential to influence decision-making.
NGO respondents questioned the industry’s commitment to thorough,
independent evaluation of the policy given their reluctance to share data;
something that is at odds with the unique contribution that they claim to be
able to make to policy development:
[It’s] a frustration to me that we haven’t had more of that contribution
of the industry’s knowledge of sales patterns, and influences on sales,
as part of the process […] I think if they’re talking about being part of
the partnership, and understanding alcohol, consumption of alcohol,
and harm in Scotland, that’s part of their contribution. If they, you know,
cut the price of a bottle of vodka in a supermarket, what impact does
that have on sales? Because they have a higher level of knowledge
and expertise in that. And none of that is now shared in the public
interest.
Other respondents, meanwhile, were aware that producer companies and
other industry bodies had recruited companies to undertake surveys on MUP
on their behalf, in an attempt to shape perceptions of the policy’s effectiveness
outside the formal evaluation process. This approach of funding alternative
studies in order to create parallel literatures on key policy issues mirrors
alcohol and tobacco industry strategies previously documented (Hawkins and
McCambridge, 2014, McCambridge et al., 2013, Jernigan, 2012, Stenius and
Babor, 2010, Caetano, 2008, Brandt, 2012, Hurt et al., 2009).
Conclusion
The use of legal challenges to unfavourable policies is in keeping with both past
studies of alcohol industry political strategies and those of the global tobacco
industry (Hawkins and Holden, 2016, Holden and Hawkins, 2018a, Jarman,
2015). Legal challenges are designed in the first instance to prevent the
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implementation of such policies. However, the importance of litigation to
industry strategies, and its effect on policy, should not be seen in such narrow,
transactional terms. Even where legal challenges fail to prevent a policy coming
into force, they offer considerable strategic advantages to industry actors.
They delay implementation, which allows the industry to continue profitable
activities in the interim and buys time to develop alternative strategies
to respond to the changing political context. Legal cases may also serve to
undermine the credibility of policies in the eyes of key political actors and
the wider public, while creating additional pressure to abandon the
contested measures. In addition, legal challenges impose significant material,
as well as political, costs on policy makers. Defending policies against legal
actions places considerable burdens on government time and resources and
undermines efforts to tackle other public policy issues. This is particularly
problematic for policy makers in smaller nations, and in the context of
decreasing governmental resources since the 2008 global financial crisis and
subsequent austerity programmes.
Perhaps of even greater value to the industry is the extent to which the mere
threat of legal challenges can significantly influence the development of policy
debates and may deter governments from bringing forward unfavoured
measures. While it is extremely difficult to capture non-action of this kind in
response to legal threats or other stimuli, the current article gets closer to this
than previous studies by using the responses of key actors in the policy process.
We document how the potential of legal action was used by the industry and
how it factored into governmental decision making in the MUP process and
subsequent alcohol policy developments.
The Scottish MUP case appears to have had a clear structuring effect on how
the Scottish Government handled both the development of MUP and the
subsequent policy agenda, delaying for instance the launch of its updated
alcohol policy strategy. In addition, the MUP case appeared to have a ‘chilling
effect’ on governments elsewhere in the UK considering similar measures. The
legal challenge to the Scottish Government’s MUP policy was instrumental in
the decision of the Westminster government to delay implementing MUP in
England in 2013, with no subsequent plans for its introduction announced to
date (Hawkins and McCambridge, 2019).
The significant financial and non-financial costs imposed by legal challenges
mean that there are strong incentives for policy makers to avoid them wherever
possible. Studies of tobacco industry litigation have found that the threat of
legal action can have a similar ‘chilling effect’ on governments (Hawkins and
Holden, 2016, Côté, 2014, Fooks and Gilmore, 2013), preventing the adoption
of evidence-based but industry-opposed measures such as standardised
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tobacco packaging. This means the mere potential to mount legal challenges is
a highly valuable tool for corporate political actors to have at their disposal; one
which is relevant not just at the implementation stage when litigation occurs,
but at all stages of the policy process. This article thus builds on previous
studies by demonstrating how legal challenges form part of a comprehensive
corporate political strategy that adapts to all stages of the policy process from
the very earliest, pre-legislative stages onwards.
Alcohol industry involvement in the process of evaluating MUP is potentially
problematic and requires further attention by policy makers, public health
advocates and scholars. Influencing strategies are often subtle, indirect and
hard to detect and require vigilance on the part of all actors involved in the
process. This is especially important given the inclusion of a sunset clause in the
legislation, which requires the policy to be reapproved by the Scottish
Parliament after 5 years. The institutionalization of MUP has been prevented
and political contestation over the policy has been kept alive by the sunset
clause, and the outcome of the evaluation will be integral to determining the
future of the policy in the context of wider political developments in Scotland.
Since the findings of evaluations of this kind are often not clear-cut, the
long-term maintenance of the policy is far from assured, and industry strategies
are likely to evolve again as this process develops. This requires vigilance by
policy makers and public health actors and offers additional opportunities for
study for health policy scholars.
Finally, this article, in highlighting the integrated and adaptive nature of
industry strategy, underlines the importance for policy researchers of focussing
on all stages of the policy process from agenda setting to evaluation and
beyond. It demonstrates that policy processes, especially in controversial issues
involving powerful vested interests, are never definitively resolved and require
ongoing engagement from policy actors to maintain even effective and well-
designed policy regimes in the face of concerted opposition.
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